Explanation

What Is SAML vs OAuth vs OIDC: The Differences Explained

Three protocols, endless confusion. SAML proves who you are to enterprise apps. OAuth lets apps access your stuff without your password. OIDC tells modern apps who you are. Here's how they actually work, why they exist, and when to use each.

Evan Mael
Evan MaelDirector anavem.com
14views
85%

of enterprises use SAML for SSO integration with SaaS applications, while 90% of modern web applications use OAuth/OIDC for consumer-facing authentication

The alphabet soup of authentication protocols confuses even experienced engineers. SAML, OAuth, OIDC - they all seem to do similar things, they all involve tokens and redirects, and vendors often use the terms interchangeably.

But these protocols serve fundamentally different purposes, and using the wrong one creates security vulnerabilities. Understanding the distinctions is essential for making correct architectural decisions.

ProtocolPurposePrimary Use Case
SAML 2.0Authentication + basic authorizationEnterprise SSO
OAuth 2.0Authorization onlyAPI access delegation
OpenID ConnectAuthentication + authorizationModern web/mobile apps

The Core Distinction: Authentication vs Authorization

Before diving into protocols, understand the fundamental concepts they address.

ConcernQuestionProtocol
AuthenticationWho are you?SAML, OIDC
AuthorizationWhat can you access?OAuth, (SAML partially)
BothWho are you and what can you do?OIDC + OAuth

SAML 2.0: The Enterprise Standard

Security Assertion Markup Language 2.0, released in 2005, remains the dominant protocol for enterprise SSO. Despite its age, SAML powers the vast majority of business-to-business authentication integrations.

How SAML Works

SAML uses XML-based messages called assertions that contain authentication statements. The flow involves browser redirects between three parties.

ComponentDescription
Identity Provider (IdP)Authenticates users, issues assertions
Service Provider (SP)Application accepting assertions
AssertionXML document proving authentication
BindingsHow messages travel (POST, Redirect)

SAML Assertion Structure

A SAML assertion contains:

<saml:Assertion>
  <saml:Issuer>https://idp.company.com</saml:Issuer>
  <saml:Subject>
    <saml:NameID>user@company.com</saml:NameID>
  </saml:Subject>
  <saml:Conditions NotBefore="..." NotOnOrAfter="..." />
  <saml:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="..." />
  <saml:AttributeStatement>
    <saml:Attribute Name="groups">
      <saml:AttributeValue>admins</saml:AttributeValue>
    </saml:Attribute>
  </saml:AttributeStatement>
</saml:Assertion>

SAML Strengths and Weaknesses

StrengthWeakness
Mature, well-understoodXML is verbose and complex
Wide enterprise supportNot designed for mobile/API
Rich attribute passingBrowser-dependent flow
Works with existing IdPsNo native refresh mechanism

OAuth 2.0: Delegated Authorization

OAuth 2.0, finalized in 2012, solves a different problem than SAML. It enables applications to access user resources on other services without receiving the user's password.

The OAuth Problem

Consider this scenario: You want a third-party app to post to your Twitter account. Before OAuth:

  • Option 1: Give the app your Twitter password (terrible idea)
  • Option 2: Build custom integration per service (does not scale)

OAuth provides a standardized way to grant limited access without sharing credentials.

OAuth Actors and Tokens

ActorRole
Resource OwnerUser who owns the data
ClientApplication requesting access
Authorization ServerIssues tokens
Resource ServerAPI hosting the data
Token TypePurposeLifetime
Access TokenGrants API accessMinutes to hours
Refresh TokenObtains new access tokensDays to months

OAuth Grant Types

GrantUse CaseSecurity Level
Authorization CodeWeb apps with backendHighest
Authorization Code + PKCEMobile/SPA appsHigh
Client CredentialsMachine-to-machineHigh (no user)
ImplicitLegacy SPAsDeprecated - do not use
PasswordTrusted first-party appsDeprecated - do not use

OpenID Connect: Authentication Meets Modern Architecture

OpenID Connect, released in 2014, builds an authentication layer on top of OAuth 2.0. It answers the question OAuth deliberately avoided: "Who is this user?"

2014

is when OIDC was finalized, making it the youngest of the three protocols - designed specifically for modern web and mobile architectures

OIDC = OAuth 2.0 + Identity Layer

OAuth 2.0 ProvidesOIDC Adds
Authorization frameworkAuthentication semantics
Access tokensID tokens
Scope-based permissionsStandard identity claims
Token endpointsUserInfo endpoint

The ID Token

OIDC introduces the ID token - a JWT containing identity claims:

{
  "iss": "https://idp.company.com",
  "sub": "user123",
  "aud": "client_app_id",
  "exp": 1699999999,
  "iat": 1699999000,
  "email": "user@company.com",
  "name": "John Doe"
}
ClaimPurpose
issToken issuer (IdP)
subSubject identifier (user ID)
audIntended audience (client)
exp/iatExpiration and issued-at times
Standard claimsemail, name, picture, etc.

OIDC Flows

FlowUse CaseTokens Returned
Authorization CodeServer-side appsID + Access (+ Refresh)
ImplicitLegacy SPAsID + Access (deprecated)
HybridSpecific security requirementsCombination

Protocol Comparison: When to Use What

The choice between protocols depends on your specific requirements. There is no universal "best" option.

Feature Comparison

FeatureSAML 2.0OAuth 2.0OIDC
AuthenticationYesNoYes
AuthorizationBasicYesYes
FormatXMLJSONJSON
Token typeAssertionAccess tokenID token + Access token
Mobile supportPoorGoodGood
API protectionPoorGoodGood
Enterprise IdP supportExcellentModerateGood
ComplexityHighMediumMedium

Decision Matrix

ScenarioRecommended Protocol
Enterprise SSO with existing IdPSAML 2.0
SaaS integration with enterpriseSAML 2.0
Modern web application authOIDC
Mobile application authOIDC
API-to-API authorizationOAuth 2.0 (Client Credentials)
Social loginOIDC
Consumer-facing applicationOIDC
Third-party API accessOAuth 2.0

Migration Considerations

FromToDifficultyApproach
SAMLOIDCMediumRun in parallel, migrate apps gradually
Custom authOIDCMedium-HighRequires application changes
OAuth (misused for auth)OIDCLowAdd ID token validation

Security Considerations

Each protocol has unique security concerns that implementations must address.

SAML Security

AttackMitigation
XML signature wrappingUse validated libraries only
Replay attacksCheck NotOnOrAfter, use one-time assertion IDs
Man-in-the-middleAlways use HTTPS, validate IdP certificate
Assertion theftShort validity windows, audience validation

OAuth Security

AttackMitigation
Authorization code interceptionUse PKCE for all clients
Token leakage via referrerUse POST, avoid tokens in URLs
Client impersonationUse client authentication, PKCE
Scope creepRequest minimal scopes, validate on resource server

OIDC Security

AttackMitigation
ID token injectionValidate signature, issuer, audience
Nonce replayGenerate unique nonce per request, verify
State parameter manipulationGenerate cryptographically random state
Token substitutionVerify at_hash claim matches access token

Common Mistakes Across Protocols

MistakeConsequence
Skipping signature validationAuthentication bypass
Long-lived tokens without refreshProlonged compromise window
Overly broad scopesExcessive access on compromise
Missing audience validationToken confusion attacks
Hardcoded secrets in codeCredential theft

Implementation Patterns

Practical implementation differs by application architecture.

Server-Side Web Applications

Best choice: OIDC Authorization Code Flow

User → App → IdP login → Auth code → App backend → Token exchange → Session
StepSecurity Consideration
Redirect to IdPInclude state parameter
Auth code returnValidate state, exchange immediately
Token exchangeHappens server-side, secrets protected
Session creationUse secure, HttpOnly cookies

Single-Page Applications

Best choice: OIDC Authorization Code with PKCE

Mobile Applications

Best choice: OIDC Authorization Code with PKCE

PlatformImplementation
iOSUse ASWebAuthenticationSession
AndroidUse Chrome Custom Tabs
BothAvoid embedded WebViews (security risks)

API-to-API (Machine-to-Machine)

Best choice: OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials

Service A → Auth server (client_id + secret) → Access token → Service B API

No user involved. Service authenticates itself to obtain tokens.

Enterprise SSO Integration

Best choice: SAML 2.0 (most enterprise IdPs prefer it)

ConfigurationPurpose
SP MetadataYour app's endpoints, certificate
IdP MetadataIdP's endpoints, certificate
Attribute mappingMap IdP attributes to app fields
Just-in-time provisioningCreate users on first login

Real-World Implementation Scenarios

Understanding how protocols combine in real architectures clarifies when to use each.

Scenario 1: Enterprise SaaS Product

A B2B SaaS product needs to support customer IdPs for SSO.

RequirementSolution
Customer SSOSAML 2.0 (customers expect it)
Internal usersOIDC with your IdP
Mobile appOIDC with PKCE
API accessOAuth 2.0 tokens

Scenario 2: Consumer Application with Social Login

A consumer-facing app allowing social and email login.

ProviderProtocolImplementation
GoogleOIDCGoogle Sign-In SDK
FacebookOAuth 2.0 + proprietaryFacebook Login SDK
AppleOIDCSign in with Apple
Email/passwordCustomYour auth system

Scenario 3: Microservices Architecture

Internal services need to communicate securely.

CommunicationProtocolToken Type
User-initiated requestsOIDCID token → access token
Service-to-serviceOAuth 2.0 Client CredentialsAccess token
Background jobsOAuth 2.0 Client CredentialsAccess token

Scenario 4: Hybrid Enterprise

Organization with on-premises AD and cloud applications.

SystemProtocolNotes
On-prem appsKerberos/NTLMExisting infrastructure
Cloud appsSAML 2.0Via Azure AD / ADFS federation
Modern appsOIDCNative Azure AD integration

Common Mistakes to Avoid

These mistakes appear repeatedly in real-world implementations.

Mistake 1: Using OAuth for Authentication

WrongRight
Validate access token → "user is authenticated"Validate ID token → user is authenticated
Use /userinfo to get identityID token contains identity claims

Mistake 2: Storing Tokens Insecurely

Storage LocationRisk LevelUse For
localStorageHigh (XSS vulnerable)Never for sensitive tokens
sessionStorageMedium (XSS vulnerable)Short-lived, low-risk tokens only
HttpOnly cookiesLowRecommended for web apps
Secure mobile storageLowKeychain (iOS), Keystore (Android)

Mistake 3: Not Validating All Token Claims

ClaimMust ValidateWhy
SignatureAlwaysProves token integrity
Issuer (iss)AlwaysPrevents cross-IdP attacks
Audience (aud)AlwaysPrevents token confusion
Expiration (exp)AlwaysPrevents replay attacks
NonceWhen presentPrevents injection

Mistake 4: Overly Broad Scopes

Request minimal scopes. If your app only needs email, don't request full profile access.

BadGood
scope=openid profile email phone addressscope=openid email
scope=https://graph.microsoft.com/.defaultSpecific Graph scopes needed

Mistake 5: Long-Lived Access Tokens

Token LifetimeAppropriate Use
5-15 minutesStandard access tokens
1-24 hoursLow-risk, internal APIs
7-90 daysRefresh tokens with rotation
Never expiresAvoid - use refresh tokens

Identity Provider Implementations

Major IdPs implement these protocols with platform-specific features.

Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD)

ProtocolSupportNotes
SAML 2.0FullEnterprise app gallery
OAuth 2.0FullMicrosoft Graph API
OIDCFullMicrosoft Identity Platform v2.0

Okta

ProtocolSupportNotes
SAML 2.0Full7000+ pre-built integrations
OAuth 2.0FullAuthorization servers
OIDCFullNative support

Auth0

ProtocolSupportNotes
SAML 2.0FullAs both IdP and SP
OAuth 2.0FullMultiple grant types
OIDCFullPrimary focus

Google Workspace

ProtocolSupportNotes
SAML 2.0FullGoogle as IdP only
OAuth 2.0FullGoogle APIs
OIDCFullGoogle Sign-In

Implementation Libraries

PlatformSAMLOAuth/OIDC
.NETITfoxtec, SustainsysMicrosoft.Identity
JavaSpring Security SAMLSpring Security OAuth
Node.jspassport-samlpassport-openidconnect
Pythonpython3-samlAuthlib, OAuthLib

Troubleshooting Common Issues

Protocol debugging requires understanding the flow and knowing where to look.

SAML Troubleshooting

IssueDiagnostic Steps
Signature validation failsCompare IdP certificate, check expiry
Audience mismatchVerify SP Entity ID matches assertion
Time-based errorsCheck server time sync (NTP)
Attribute not passedCheck IdP attribute release configuration
Redirect loopVerify ACS URL, check session handling

OAuth/OIDC Troubleshooting

ErrorLikely Cause
invalid_clientWrong client ID or secret
invalid_grantExpired auth code, already used code
invalid_scopeRequested scope not configured
access_deniedUser denied consent
invalid_requestMissing required parameter

Token Validation Issues

ProblemCheck
Token rejectedSignature algorithm matches IdP config
Wrong userValidate sub claim, not just access
Permissions wrongCheck scopes in token vs requested
Token expiredClient clock sync, token lifetime config

Common Integration Issues

SymptomInvestigation
Works in test, fails in productionEnvironment-specific URLs, certificates
Intermittent failuresClock skew, network timeouts
Works for some usersGroup/role membership, conditional access
Mobile only issuesCustom tab/WebView configuration

Conclusion: Choosing the Right Protocol

The choice between SAML, OAuth, and OIDC is not about which is "best" but which fits your requirements.

Quick Decision Guide

Key Takeaways

TakeawayDetail
SAML is not deadStill dominant for enterprise B2B SSO
OAuth is not authenticationUse OIDC when you need identity
OIDC is the modern choiceFor new apps, especially mobile
Multiple protocols coexistMost organizations use several
Security requires attentionEach protocol has specific risks

Implementation Priority

PriorityAction
1Use established libraries - never roll your own crypto
2Validate all token claims - signatures, issuer, audience, expiry
3Secure token storage - server-side or secure device storage
4Minimal scopes - request only what you need
5Short lifetimes - use refresh tokens for longevity

For deeper protocol exploration, see our dedicated guides on SAML 2.0 Configuration, OAuth 2.0 Best Practices, and OpenID Connect Implementation.

Frequently Asked Questions

SAML is an authentication protocol - it proves who a user is. OAuth is an authorization protocol - it grants applications permission to access resources. SAML tells Salesforce 'This is Alice from Acme Corp.' OAuth tells Google Photos 'Alice allows this printing app to read her photos.' They solve fundamentally different problems.

You shouldn't. OAuth proves that authorization was granted, not who granted it. Using OAuth alone for authentication creates security vulnerabilities - attackers can use tokens obtained through other means to impersonate users. If you need authentication with OAuth-style flows, use OIDC, which was specifically designed to add authentication to OAuth.

OIDC is an authentication layer built on top of OAuth 2.0. It uses OAuth's authorization flows but adds identity information through ID tokens. When you authenticate with OIDC, you receive both an ID token (who the user is) and an access token (authorization for API access). Think of OIDC as 'OAuth plus identity.'

Use SAML when integrating with enterprise customers who require it, when connecting to applications that only support SAML, or when you're already operating in a SAML-heavy environment. Many enterprise SaaS applications only support SAML for SSO. For new development without enterprise constraints, OIDC is usually simpler and more developer-friendly.

An ID token contains claims about the authenticated user (who they are) and is consumed by your application. An access token grants permission to call APIs (what the app can do) and is presented to resource servers. In OIDC, you typically receive both: the ID token identifies the user; the access token authorizes API calls on their behalf.

PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) is an OAuth extension that prevents authorization code interception attacks. When your app initiates the OAuth flow, it generates a secret and sends a hash of it. When exchanging the code for tokens, the app proves it has the original secret. PKCE is required for mobile apps and SPAs, and recommended for all OAuth implementations.

Logout is tricky in federated systems. SAML defines Single Logout (SLO) to propagate logout across applications, but reliable implementation is challenging. OIDC defines similar mechanisms (RP-Initiated Logout, Back-Channel Logout). In practice, applications handle local session termination easily, but ensuring logout propagates everywhere remains difficult.

Yes, and this is common. Identity providers like Okta and Azure AD support both SAML and OIDC for the same users. Applications can accept authentication from either protocol and normalize identity internally. Enterprise customers might use SAML while consumer users authenticate via OIDC social login.

For SAML: signature validation failures - ensure assertions are properly signed by the expected IdP. For OAuth: redirect URI validation and token storage - validate redirect URIs exactly and protect tokens from XSS. For OIDC: ID token validation - verify signatures, issuers, audiences, and expiration. All protocols require TLS for transport.

For a new application without specific SAML requirements, start with OIDC. It's simpler to implement, works well with modern architectures, and supports both mobile and web. If you're building APIs that third parties will consume, add OAuth for authorization. If enterprise customers will require corporate SSO, plan to add SAML support alongside OIDC.

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